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The proposed  Mackenzie  Valley  pipeline  is 
reputed to be one of the largest private en- 
gineering and investment projects in Cana- 
dian  history.  Whether this is true  or  not 
remains to be seen, but it has certainly be- 
come part of one of the biggest public im- 
broglios since the building of the Canadian 
Pacific  Railway at the end of the last century. 
The events surrounding this  controversy  have 
all the  bizarre trappings of a  Richard Rohmer 
novel - political  hypocrisy, bureaucratic 
bungling, conniving by industry, foreign in- 
trigue and public wrangling over  matters of 
Canadian sovereignty. 
The National Interest at first glance, and 
especially in the light of circumstances and 
present  knowledge, appears  to  be  a damning 
indictment of the  Canadian Government's 
northern development  policies  during the past 
critical decade, as well as of the oil and gas 
industry  in  general.  Decjsions appear to have 
been  made  in  private,  and  announcements 
concerning  public  policy  in northern  Canada 
have only been dimly perceived and under- 
stood, if at all, by an uninformed public. 
The Canadian government seems to have 
done everything  wrong  and, to make matters 
worse, to have offended nearly everyone in 
the process. By relying primarily on the pub- 
lic  record,  with the occasional  excursion into 
confidential  documents, Dosman  has provided 
a chilling  record of how concern for the 
northern environment  as  well  as for  the rights 
of the original peoples of the north were 
overlooked, deliberately ignored, or shunted 
aside by a phalanx of committees  composed 
almost  entirely of senior bureaucrats and 
representatives of industry. Canada's priori- 
ties  during the past  decade  were  obviously to 
push  ahead at breakneck  speed  with plans to 
develop the North, largely through oil and 
gas exploration and production, almost en- 
tirely under private - including foreign - 
sponsorship, with the apparent aim of com- 
mitting the bulk of Canada's northern energy 
resources to U.S. markets. 
If the governmental attitude was suspect, 
industry's would appear to have been based 
purely on self-interest in its dealings with 
public  bodies, particularly the  National 
Energy Board which found itself almost to- 
tally  unprepared to deal  with the fast-moving 
events that occurred after the dramatic dis- 
coveries of oil and gas  in Prudhoe Bay,  Alas- 
ka  in 1968. To suit its own  purposes,  industry 
painted a glowing picture of Canada's  oil and 
gas  resources  based, it would  seem, on projec- 
tions of reserves  which have now  been  proven 
to be  vastly  overestimated. The  Canadian 
government  was  misled into accepting, as 
reliable data, estimates that suggested Canada 
had  reserves far in excess of its own re- 
quirements. This evaluation of erroneous 
information provided by industry was  largely 
responsible for a series of events  which  were 
ultimately to contribute greatly to the energy 
crisis now emerging in Canada. (It is some- 
what alarming to learn, for example, that as 
recently  as 1970, the  National Energy  Board 
approved the largest sale of gas for export 
in Canadian history, only to turn down 
further applications  just a  year later because 
an exportable surplus did not, in fact, exist. 
Even as late as 1971, a Cabinet minister is 
on  record  as  stating that Canada  has reserves 
of oil for 923 years and gas for 392 years!) 
Much of Dosman's intriguing account is 
centred on the details  concerning the  promo- 
tion of an energy corridor down the Macken- ' 
zie River valley and the workings of groups 
of bureaucrats and representatives of indus- 
try who appear to have made far-reaching 
policy decisions with apparent disregard for 
the  Canadian  parliament or other open 
forums. The fact that these  groups  were able 
to operate  within an  environment  where con- 
flicts of interest were seldom recognized, or 
permitted to intrude, suggests a  major defect 
in the public policy-making process which, 
it would seem, serves the national interest 
badly. 
There are, however, at least two sides to 
every story, and this one is no exception. In 
the context of 1968, there  are reasons to 
believe the policy makers may  not  have  been 
so bumbling, or that  the machinations  of 
senior  industry and government  official  were 
so sinister and deceitful. Northern develop- 
ment had, after all, been a  national obsession 
for many  years,  and  in the sixties the seem- 
ingly bountiful oil and gas resources were 
at last a firm  peg on which to hang  the  dream. 
Who  could  possibly argue against the extent 
and the  value of the benefits to northerners, 
and other Canadians, accruing from large 
capital investments, employment opportuni- 
ties, exports, etc. As the plans for the Mac- 
kenzie  Valley  pipeline  were  divulged  by 
government and industry (or  ferreted  out by 
native organizations, public interest groups 
and  others)  the basic  assumptions  underlying 
northern development strategies were chal- 
lenged. As  Dosman documents, the chief 
opponents of the enterprise  soon found them- 
selves having to deal with questions which 
were to prove extremely controversial and 
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difficult to resolve. 
Who had responsibility for native  peoples? 
The Canadian government’s  patronizing atti- 
tude towards the native northerner as a ward 
of the  state  in  the nineteen  sixties is an em- 
barrassing  anachronism  when  looked at then 
and today. It is not difficult to agree with 
the author’s  view that  it represented “a shock- 
ing  disregard for environmental  demands and 
native rights.” Nevertheless, it is significant 
that in the  short span of less than ten years 
native  power has become a political fact of 
life in Canada; aboriginal treaty rights are 
steadily gaining recognition, land claims are 
being settled, and above all, the legitimate 
aspirations of native minority groups to de- 
sign and pursue their own culture and en- 
vironmental  destiny  seem to be gaining 
general  public  acceptance. 
Was Canada’s sovereign0 in  the North 
threatened? Indeed it was, in 1969, with the 
announced  int.ention  of  a  large  foreign-owned 
oil company to send,  with  U.S.  Coast Guard 
assistance, the tanker Manhattan through the 
Northwest  Passage  without prior consulta- 
tion  with the Canadian government. The 
event caught Canada by surprise, without a 
clear  vision of its  national  position and of its 
responsibilities in  the North. It did,  however, 
precipitate  swift  action in  the confirmation  by 
Canada of its control over the Arctic  lands, 
including the vast  continental  shelf. In addi- 
tion  (a  brilliant  diplomatic  oup) Canada 
asserted  sovereignty  over the Northwest  Pas- 
sage  by  means  of the Arctic  Waters  Pollution 
Prevention Act which not only implemented 
a twelve-mile  limit but extended  Canada’s 
effective jurisdiction for one hundred miles 
offshore. 
Was there too much foreign  economic con- 
trol  and  investment  in  the North? Until 
recently, both the federal  and provincial  gov- 
ernments of Canada encouraged an open-door 
foreign investment policy. The question of 
control was still an open one, but the country 
was  clearly marching to the economic drum- 
beat of foreign investors, who owned a sub- 
stantial portion of  Canada’s corporate assets. 
Today the situation appears to be changing 
dramatically as  the so-called  general  benefits 
of foreign  investment are seen for what they 
are. The screening of further foreign invest- 
ment, the greater use of Canadian engineer- 
ing  firms, the success  of Panarctic  Oils 
Limited  (Canadian  government  controlled) 
are but examples of many steps that have 
been  taken to ensure that  future foreign in- 
vestment in the North will be more closely 
related to Canada’s overall social and eco- 
nomic  goals. 
No doubt many readers of this book will 
take exception to its author’s interpretation 
of certain events surrounding the proposed 
pipeline and the motivations, real or other- 
wise, attributed to the main actors involved 
in this national drama. As an example, one 
could argue that his statement on  the cover 
of the book that Canada is committed, and 
has been for some time, to a pipeline that 
will pump its resources  traight into the 
United  States, is not confirmed  by a reading 
of the book. He describes in some detail  how 
the case for the export of gas from the Arctic 
was weakened, if not killed altogether, by a 
serious shortage within Canada, which was 
predicted at National Energy  Board  hearings 
held in 1974 and 1975. 
There is another central question  which  is 
not  satisfactorily  resolved  by the author, and 
that is the effectiveness of the method for 
dealing  with important public  policy  issues in 
Canada. He suggests that  there has been no 
real public debate on the proposed pipeline 
and writes off completely the Berger Com- 
mission, the vocal and effective  protests  of a 
host of native organizations and public in- 
terest groups like the Canadian Arctic Re- 
sources  Committee, the media and so on, and 
the belated  realizations  of a (hopefully) 
chastened National Energy Board. The Na- 
tional  Interest in fact provides  ample  evidence 
that attitudes and policies of industry and 
government  have  been  changed  by the pres- 
sure tactics of various  organizations, and 
especially  by the concern and involvement  of 
the public. I t  cannot be denied that  the  pro- 
cess of change in the North has been, and 
still  is,  a  case  of  muddling through one crisis 
after another, but there should be some  con- 
solation in  the  fact  that when  faced  with the 
choice  of  solutions that  are intellectually 
strong but politically hard, or those that  are 
intellectually weak and politically easy, the 
former approach has generally  been  favoured 
by  government. 
From 1968 to the present, there is little 
doubt that policies on northern development 
have  been  seriously  flawed, and The National 
Interest lists some of the incredible  possibili- 
ties  (such  as the near-commitment to a  long- 
term continental energy policy) that might 
have ultimately compromised Canada’s eco- 
nomic  independence. For those  who.  like the 
author, are concerned with the  future of 
Canada’s northern resources, this is an im- 
portant book. As he himself  observes, and the 
reader cannot but appreciate,  -although there 
are no villains in this piece, there are no 
heroes  either! 
Kenneth de la  Barre 
